connection to the financial market. The contracting agreement helps them to obtain raw materials in advance usually with a forward contract to sell final goods, and overcome the difficulties of procuring raw materials by many unorganised enterprises (Chadha, 2003; Sahu, 2008) .
However, there is no reason to believe that the smaller units working under contracting arrangement enjoyed the advantages of it alone. They also have to face a lot of difficulties. As the contractual relationship here is between two unequal partners, quite often the larger units extract more benefit out of this unequal relationship, and transfer the burden of market fluctuations on its subcontractors by adopting various tactics like delayed payment of bills, refusing to take delivery of goods, postponing inspection of materials, and so on. It is also easier for the parent units to abandon the contract and thereby forcing its subcontractors to lay off their workers rather than dismissing their own workers during the period of recession (Nagaraj, 1984; NCEUS, 2009; Sahu, 2008 ).
This chapter examines the incidence of inter-firm linkage across different categories (sub-sectors) of unorganised manufacturing enterprises in India using the NSSO data on unorganised manufacturing sector for the 51 st and 67 th Rounds. It should be mentioned here that the information on inter-firm linkage, as available from these NSSO rounds are not comparable due to difference in questions asked to capture inter-firm linkage. While in the survey of 1994-95, the NSSO directly asked the enterprises whether they were ancillary to the parent firm or not, in the 2010-11 survey they enquired whether the surveyed units had undertaken any work on contract basis during the reference period. Such an important
methodological difference compels us to analyze the two sets of data separately. Besides examining the incidence of inter-firm linkage, we looked into various features of 'subcontracting' arrangement in the context of the NSSO data for 2010-11. We also attempt an econometric exercise to identify a few factors that determine the subcontracting status of an enterprise, i.e., whether the enterprise would enter into a subcontracting arrangement or not.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The present Section 7.1 provided an introduction to the chapter. In Section 7.2, we analyze the incidence of inter-firm linkage in terms of 'ancillarization' and 'subcontracting' in the industry of unorganised manufacturing.
Section 7.3 discusses the pattern of such agreement in detail by considering the data for 67 th round. The pattern of contracting agreement has been analyzed by looking into the nature of marketing agreement, number of parent firms served by a contracting unit, conditions of agreement related to obtaining raw materials and other technical supports, and the level of independence enjoyed by the smaller firms while deciding the price of their product following an escalation in the input prices. Section 7.4 identifies the factors determining subcontracting status of the enterprises. Finally, the overall findings of the chapter are summarized in Section 7.5.
Incidence of Inter-firm Linkage in Unorganised Manufacturing Sector
Ancillarization: Evidence from 1994-95 Survey Table 7 .1 shows that the incidence of inter-firm linkage in terms of ancillarization was abysmally low in 1994-95 for all three sub-sectors of the industry of unorganised manufacturing. It varied between 2.6 percent for rural OAMEs to 8.9 percent for urban DMEs. In rural areas, only 3.9 percent of the DMEs reported that they were ancillary to the parent firm, while 3.5 percent of the NDMEs and 2.6 percent of the OAMEs reported the same. In urban areas, the corresponding figures were slightly higher. Here the DMEs reported highest incidence of ancillarization, followed by the OAMEs and the NDMEs.
While 8.9 percent of the DMEs are reported to have worked as ancillary to the parent company, 6.0 percent enterprises of the OAMEs reported the same. The corresponding figure for the NDMEs was slightly less (4.8 percent). Why the incidence of inter-firm linkage turned out to be so low in 1994-95?
Perhaps, the answer lies in the definition of 'ancillarization' adopted by the NSSO in its survey. In this survey, an ancillary unit is defined as the unit that sold 30 percent or more of its product(s) to the parent unit for assembly purposes (i.e., for being used without further change in form/shape etc.) in the manufacture of finished products by the parent unit. The phrase 'for assembly purposes' used to capture inter-firm linkage seems to have resulted in its high under-reporting. Actually, the type of inter-firm linkage the NSSO survey sought to record is found only in a limited number of units like those in automobile industry, where different firms specialize to produce different parts of the products, and finally they are assembled by another firm who is the seller of the final product.
Subcontracting: Evidence from 2010-11 Survey
Let us now consider the data for 2010-11 to look into the inter-firm linkage in terms of subcontracting. Table 7 .2 presents information on the incidence of subcontracting by the three categories of firms -Own Account Manufacturing Enterprises (OAMEs), NonDirectory Manufacturing Establishments (NDMEs) and Directory Manufacturing Establishments (DMEs). Considering the rural and urban areas together, the incidence of subcontracting is found to be higher for the OAMEs (21.4 percent), in comparison with the DMEs (16.9 percent) and the NDMEs (8.5 percent). Comparison of rural and urban areas reveals that, in general, the incidence of subcontracting is found to be higher in the rural areas for all three categories of the enterprises. Table 7 .2 further shows that the OAMEs in rural areas reported highest incidence of subcontracting in 2010-11. Almost 24.3 percent of the OAME units in rural areas worked under subcontracting, followed by the DMEs (18.8 percent) and the NDMEs (9.1 percent).
On the other hand, in urban areas, nearly 84 percent of the DME units and 90 percent of the NDME units marketed their products themselves, while the rest have responded as per order of the contractors. This implies that similar to that of the rural areas, the incidence of subcontracting is found to be higher for the OAMEs in comparison with the NDMEs and the DMEs in urban areas as well. Nearly 17 percent of the OAMEs in urban areas depended on the contractors/master enterprises for selling their products in 2010-11 1 .
Pattern of Subcontracting Agreement According to 2010-11 Survey

Conditions of Marketing Agreement
The conditions of marketing agreement in subcontracting arrangement vary among the subcontracted firms. More often it is confined to selling the products to the parent company. However, whether the subcontracted enterprises sold whole of their produce or a part of it to the parent unit, varies depending upon the agreements. This aspect of subcontracting agreement helped us to understand whether the subcontracted units within the UMS depends exclusively on the parent units for marketing their products or would be able to sell a part of their production on their own, without depending on the parent units.
Obviously, the marketing dependence on the parent/master unit is higher for those subcontracted units that are found to sell whole of their produce to the parent unit, while the dependence is comparatively less for those who sold only a part of their produce to the parent unit. Table 7 .3 shows that vast majority of the UMS that are reported to have entered into subcontracting arrangements agreed to supply whole of their produce to their parent units.
The observation remains valid for all three categories of the enterprises. In rural areas, 94 percent of the subcontracted OAMEs reported to have supplied whole of their produce to the parent unit, while 93.7 percent of the subcontracted DMEs and 89 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs did so. This implies that, in rural areas, vast majority of the subcontracted enterprises of the 'tiniest' OAMEs as well as the 'largest' DMEs worked exclusively as per order of their parent unit. However, for the 'medium size' NDMEs, an appreciable proportion (around 11 percent) of subcontracted units are found to have sold a part of their produce to other customers apart from the parent unit.
1 Why the incidence of subcontracting is considerably higher among the OAMEs, especially in rural areas, compared to the establishments is an issue which is probed below. In this respect, we argue that it might be due to the fact that while the establishments are largely engaged in contracting agreement with the private enterprises, the OAMEs entered into contractual arrangements more with the middlemen. It is also known that while the private enterprises are mainly concentrated in the urban periphery, the middlemen are found in all areas (Chadha, 2003 , Ananda Bazer Patrika, 2010 . In urban areas, on the other hand, comparatively lower proportion of the Table 7 .4 presents the proportion of the subcontracted units within the UMS that are reported to have served single parent unit during the reference period of NSSO 67 th round survey. This information is important as the risk associated with product marketing declines with increase in the number of customers. In the present circumstance, the marketing risk is much higher for those subcontracted units that served single parent unit during the reference period.
Evidence of Serving a Single Parent Firm
For rural and urban areas combined, 66 percent of the contracting enterprises within the UMS as a whole reported to have served the single parent unit throughout the reference period of 2010-11. Decomposition of the UMS at the subsector level reveals that 67.8 percent of the subcontracted OAMEs served the single parent unit, while 57 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs and 47 percent of the subcontracted DMEs worked for more than one parent unit during the same period. It seems that while larger production scale of the subcontracted establishments (NDMEs/DMEs) enabled them to serve multiple parent units simultaneously, lower scale of production of the subcontracted OAMEs compelled them to work for single parent unit throughout the year. Comparison of rural and urban areas for the three categories of the enterprises and the UMS as a whole reveals that comparatively higher proportion of the subcontracted units in rural areas depended on the single parent unit to sell their products. For the OAMEs, while 68.9 percent of the subcontracted units in rural areas are reported to have served the single parent unit, the corresponding proportion is found to be 64.9 percent in urban areas.
For the rurally located NDMEs and the DMEs, although majority of the subcontracted enterprises worked solely for the single parent unit, majority of the subcontracted units in urban areas, under these categories, are found to have done their business with more than one parent unit during the reference period of 2010-11. To be specific, 49.2 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs and 64.3 percent of the subcontracted DMEs in rural areas are reported to have served the single parent unit, while the corresponding proportions in urban areas are 38.4 percent and 46.6 percent respectively. Clearly, by serving more than one parent unit simultaneously, substantial proportion of the subcontracted NDMEs and the DMEs, especially those located in urban areas would be able to reduce the marketing risk.
However, due to low scale of production majority of the 'tiniest' OAMEs, irrespective of their location of operation, are unable to do so and hence run their businesses under higher levels of marketing risk.
Other Aspects of Agreement
The subcontracting arrangement was not limited to marketing agreements alone. The master units/contractors often provide raw materials and/or technical support to the smaller firms against which the later agree to sell either the whole or a part of their product to the former. The master units provide technical support either in the form of supplying plant and machineries and/or by specifying the technology/design/specification of the products. In fact, the smaller units face difficulties in upgrading or maintaining the tools and equipments used in production at a regular interval due to lack of financial resources. It is also difficult for the smaller units, especially those operating from the households, to get upgraded as per the customers' choice. The enterprises that receive technical support from the parent company are likely to overcome these difficulties. In order to investigate this issue, the NSSO asked the subcontracted units whether the coverage of agreement with the parent units includes provisioning of raw materials and/or technology/designs/specification and/or plant and machinery. The findings in this respect are presented in Table 7 .5. Rural Urban Rural + Urban OAME NDME DME ALL OAME NDME DME ALL OAME NDME DME ALL It is found that vast majority of the subcontracted enterprises within the UMS, irrespective of their location of operation, depended on the master units for getting raw materials as well as technology/designs/specification of products as a part of the contracting agreement. In rural areas, the corresponding proportion is more than 80 percent, while the same being 68.4 percent in urban areas. In both the areas, a sizable proportion of the The coverage of agreement experienced by the DMEs is found to be different to some extent than that of the OAMEs and the NDMEs, particularly in rural areas. This is so because although obtaining both the raw materials as well as the technology/designs/specification of products from the parent units is found to be the most common form of the coverage of subcontracting agreement in rural areas, the next important form of such agreement is that of obtaining all three kinds of assistances (raw materials, technology/design/specification as well as plant and machineries) simultaneously from the parent units. While 46.1 percent of the subcontracted DMEs in rural areas are reported to have obtained raw materials and technology/designs/specification of products, 33.5 percent of them are reported to have obtained the plant and machineries along with raw materials and technology/designs/specification of products from their parent units. These DME units who obtained all three kinds of assistances from their parent units may be considered to be the 'fortunate' ones in the UMS in India, as they enjoyed the benefit of 'technology transfer' from their parent units that was possible after entering into the subcontracting arrangements. However, in urban areas, the proportion of the subcontracted DMEs obtaining all three kinds of assistances from their parent units is almost rare (1.4 percent only). Here majority of the subcontracted DMEs obtained raw materials and technology/design/specification or one of them.
Coverage of Post-Agreement Input Price Escalation
Whether or not the subcontracting agreement allows the subcontracted units to raise product prices in the event of escalation of input prices after the agreements are finalized is another important indicator of the condition of such agreements. As shown in Table 7 .6 that, in 2010-11, only about one-fourth of the subcontracted units of the UMS (combining rural and urban areas together) were allowed to go in for raising product prices following any post-agreement input price escalation. This proportion did not differ much between rural and urban areas. Thus, a vast majority of the unorganised manufacturing enterprises in India did not enjoy such independence and were subjected to exploitation by their parent units.
Looking at the subsector level, we found that, in rural areas, nearly 49.4 percent of the subcontracted DMEs and 41.5 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs were allowed to raise product prices after any post-agreement input price escalation, which for the OAMEs was 22.7 percent only. In urban areas, on the other hand, while 31.4 percent of the subcontracted DMEs and 28.9 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs were allowed to do so, the corresponding figure for the OAMEs has been 24.3 percent. The OAMEs benefitted less in this regard as compared to the establishments possibly because of their lower bargaining strength. It is also clear from the above discussion that, for the establishments (NDMEs/DMEs), comparatively higher proportion of the subcontracted units in rural areas as compared to urban areas enjoyed the benefit of raising their product prices in the event of an escalation in the price of inputs. This indicates towards higher bargaining strength of the rural establishments as compared to their urban counterpart. Apparently, this finding looks odd as the urban units are more likely to have better capital base, more skilled manpower, and hence able to produce at a large scale, which should enhance their bargaining strength vis-a-vis the parent units. However, the difference between the parent units served by the establishments in rural and urban areas might explain such an inconsistency. It is possible that the urban establishments obtain the contract directly from larger production or trade houses, while the rural establishments get connected with the need to rely upon the indirect linkage with parent units via the middlemen. This makes the bargaining strength of the subcontracted establishments in rural areas higher than those in urban areas.
Determinants of Subcontracting Status of the Unorganised Manufacturing Enterprises
In this section, we seek to identify a few determinants of subcontracting status of the unorganised manufacturing enterprises in India. For this purpose, we have estimated a logit regression model using the unit level data 2 extracted from the data files of 67 th Round of the NSSO survey. The dependent variable in our logit regression model represents the subcontracting status (STAT) of an enterprise, which is a binary variable that is assigned value '1', if the enterprise entered into any subcontracting arrangement and '0' otherwise.
The explanatory variables considered are the following:
(1) SEX: a dummy variable, which takes value '1', if the enterprise is owned by a female proprietor and '0' otherwise.
(2) REGST_STAT: a dummy variable, which is assigned value '1' if the enterprise is registered (under shops and establishment act or municipal corporation/panchayats/local body or vat/sales tax act or provident fund act or employees state insurance corporation act), and 0 otherwise.
(3) PROB: a dummy variable, which is assigned value '1' if the enterprise faced a problem like non-availability/high cost of credit, shortage of raw materials, erratic power supply/power cuts, shrinkage/fall of demand, non-recovery of financial dues, non-availability of labor as and when required, labour disputes, etc., and '0' otherwise.
(4) ENT1, ENT2: enterprise dummies. The value of ENT1 is '1' for an Own Account Manufacturing Enterprise (OAME) and '0' otherwise; ENT2 takes value '1' for the Directory Manufacturing Establishment (DME) and '0' otherwise. Thus, NonDirectory Manufacturing Establishment (NDME) is considered as the reference category.
(5) REG: region dummy whose value is '1' if the enterprise is located in rural areas and '0' if it is in urban areas. Table 7 .7 presents the logit regression results. It is found that the estimated coefficient of SEX is positive and statistically significant. This implies that the probability of entering into a subcontracting arrangement is higher for the female-owned units them aside from our regression exercise. However, it is worth mentioning that the unorganised manufacturing sector in India is vastly dominated by the proprietary enterprises (nearly 98% of all enterprises in 2010-11).
Logit Regression Results
compared to the male-owned units. The value of odds-ratio here reveals that the probability of a female-owned unit entering into the subcontracting arrangement is 3.67 times greater than that of a male-owned unit. This result may be explained in the following way. Apart from being involved in organization of production, women entrepreneurs are required to perform domestic duties. In this situation, subcontracting helps them to avoid the hazards associated with marketing of their products and also to save time which they spend for their families. It is also quite possible that cultural barriers prevent women entrepreneurs to move freely to sell their products even in local markets (NCEUS, 2009). It is also observed from Table 7 .7 that the probability of entering into subcontracting arrangement goes down if the units are registered with shops and establishment act or municipal corporation/panchayats/local body or vat/sales tax act or provident fund act or employees state insurance corporation act etc. This is revealed by negative as well as statistically significant value of coefficient of REG_STAT. The value of odds-ratio here implies that the probability of entering into a subcontracting arrangement by a registered firm in the UMS is 0.77 times less than the same for a firm that is not registered to any agency mentioned above. In fact, registration is one of the basic requirements to obtain various kinds of government assistances like credit availability, marketing support through trade fairs, exhibition or buyers and sellers meet, training programs, etc. This indicates that the registered units in the UMS are more likely to obtain such benefits and thereby would depend relatively less on the sub-contractors.
Again, our findings show that the units facing problems related to availability of credit, shortage of raw materials, erratic power supply, fall of demand, non-recovery of financial dues, and so on, during one year preceding the date of NSSO survey are more likely to enter into contracting agreements. On the basis of the odds-ratio, it can be said that the probability of entering into subcontracting for the units facing any of above-mentioned problems is 1.28 times higher than those who did not experience such problems. In fact, apart from the problem related to electricity, the unorganised units are often able to solve other problems when they work under contracting arrangements. Possibly because of this reason, they prefer to work under subcontract. Table 7 .7 also shows that the estimated coefficient of ENT1 is negative and statistically significant. This implies that, compared to the NDMEs, OAMEs are less likely to enter into sub-contracting arrangements. The value of odds-ratio here suggests that the probability of working under contracting arrangement by a NDME unit is 0.74 times higher compared to an OAME unit. However, the estimated coefficient of ENT2 being positive and statistically significant implies that the probability of working under subcontracting by a DME unit is greater than the probability of doing so by a NDME unit. The value of oddsratio shows that the probability of getting involved into a subcontracting arrangement by the DME unit is 2.80 times higher than the probability of doing so by the NDME unit.
Overall, it appears that relatively bigger units (both in terms of manpower and capital base) in the unorganised manufacturing sector in India have greater probability of going in for subcontracting arrangements. Such a finding is not at all unusual. It has been reported in the literature that, to reduce the cost of production and ensuring quality of product and its supply on time, the parent units (those in the formal or organised sector) usually prefer to outsource to the bigger units that have superior capital base and manpower (Moreno-Monroy et al., 2012) . Hence it is quite likely that among the unorganised manufacturing units, the bigger ones (NDMEs and DMEs) display higher probability of entering into the subcontracting arrangements.
The estimated coefficient of the region dummy (REG) has a positive sign, implying that the rural units are more likely to enter into subcontracting arrangements. The estimated coefficient of REG is found to be statistically significant at 10 percent level of significance.
Such a finding indicates that possibly due higher marketing bottlenecks faced by the rural units they are more likely to enter into subcontracting arrangements as compared to their urban counterpart.
Summing Up
This chapter examined various issues relating to inter-firm linkage or 'subcontracting' arrangements that the enterprises of the unorganised manufacturing units have entered into with their parent units. However, non-availability of comparable data over the years has constrained our discussion here. We found that a considerable proportion of the enterprises under all categories of unorganised manufacturing worked under 'contracting' arrangements during 2010-11. Comparison of three categories of enterprises in this regard revealed that the incidence of subcontracting was the highest for the OAMEs (21.4), which is followed by the DMEs (16.9) and the NDMEs (8.5), considering rural and urban areas together.
As regards the features of subcontracting agreements in 2010-11, our finding is that vast majority of the UMS enterprises entered into subcontracting arrangements to supply whole of their produce to their parent units. This observation remains valid for all categories of the enterprises, irrespective of whether they are located in rural or urban areas. However, considering the rural and urban areas together, we observed that while 70 percent of the subcontracted OAMEs served the single parent unit throughout the year, 57 percent of the subcontracted NDMEs, and 47 percent of the subcontracted DMEs worked for more than one parent unit. Possibly larger production scale of the subcontracted establishments (NDMEs/DMEs) enabled them to serve more than one parent unit simultaneously while lower scale of production of the subcontracted OAMEs constrained them to work for single parent unit throughout the year.
Our data revealed that the contracting agreements were not confined to marketing agreements alone. In fact, these included the provisions of supplying raw materials, design or product specification as well as plant and machineries by the parent units/contractors against which the contracted enterprises agreed to sell either the whole or a part of their produce to the former. Indeed, we found that vast majority of the UMS enterprises (considering rural and urban areas together) depended on the 'master/parent units' for getting raw materials and/or design specification, as part of the contracting agreements. This is true for all three categories of the UMS. However, the incidence of obtaining plant and machineries from the parent units was very low especially among the OAMEs and the NDMEs. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the DMEs, especially in rural areas, enjoyed the advantage of 'technology transfer' in the form of getting necessary machineries or equipments from their parent units.
As regards the UMS enterprises' freedom to raise product prices following escalation of input price after signing the agreements, our observation is that about onefourth of the subcontracted units enjoyed such freedom, both in rural and urban areas.
However, our analysis at the subsector level revealed that as compared to the NDMEs and the DMEs, less proportion of the contracted OAMEs were allowed to set higher prices of their outputs following an increase in input prices.
We estimated a logit regression model to identify some possible determinants of subcontracting among the unorganised manufacturing units in India. Our main conclusion here is that the probability of getting involved into a subcontract rises statistically significantly if the owner of the enterprise is a female, the enterprise is not registered under any act/authority, it faced any problem in its operation during one year preceding the survey date, and it is located in rural areas. Among three types of enterprises, the probability of entering into subcontracting is significantly higher for the DMEs compared to the NDMEs.
However, the NDMEs have significantly higher probability of entering into subcontracting arrangements when compared with the OAMEs. 
